LIBERAL AUTHORITARIANISM VS ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
I was reading a review today in Foreign Affairs of Fareed Zakaria's new book The Future of Freedom.

According to the review, one of the two theses of the book is Zakaria's contention "that many developing societies initially fare best under what he calls 'liberal authoritarian regimes'..."

The review observes:
Zakaria argues that the best way to turn developing countries into liberal democracies is by fostering constitutional liberty rather than democracy. If electoral democracy is established in a society before it has achieved constitutional liberty, it is likely to either end up as an "illiberal democracy" (like Russia) or degenerate into fascism or populist authoritarianism (as Germany and Italy did between the world wars). He speculates that if elections were held now in many Middle Eastern or North African countries, they would be won by fundamentalist parties that would proceed to destroy whatever modicum of liberty exists and probably eliminate future elections as well.

Of course, in this context, "liberal" is used not in the American sense (left of center) but in the classical sense (promoting personal and economic freedom).

It's really an interesting argument. And one not entirely without merit. Zakaria is right that a truly democratic Middle East would likely place in power anti-democratic Islamists. I've long been troubled by the paradox of what happened in Algeria. After a long period of one-party rule by the National Liberation Front (FLN) followed by military rule, the generals allowed free elections in the early 1990s. The fundametalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was on the verge of a landslide election victory when the military cancelled the poll. The Islamists responded by launching a brutal guerrilla terrorist civil war that's claimed tens of thousands of lives, both in Islamist attacks and army retaliatiatory excesses. (Ironically, it's the kind of war the ruling FLN had successfully waged in expelling the colonial French)

This is the ultimate paradox of democratic liberalism. What happens if the people freely and democratically choose a group whose stated objectives are unfree and anti-democratic? I'm not exactly sure what the solution is. My best guess is that maybe a compromise is something along the lines of what goes on in Turkey. Basically, they have a fairly free political system with both democracy and constitutional liberty. But the military acts as a check on extremist tendencies. For example, in 1997, the army pressured the elected Islamist government to resign because the military felt the government was straying too far from the vehemently secular principles of the Turkish republic.

Such military paternalism is not a particularly satisfactory solution. It is certainly has to potential to be very problematic for reasons which you don't need a PhD in political science to envisage. But in some circumstances, it may be the least unpalatable compromise. Is such a system the only medium between a brutal military dictatorship and a repressive or omnipresent (initially popular) theocracy like Taliban Afghanistan or Khomeni's Iran?


Nevertheless, I find two gaping flaws in Zakaria's argument. He contends that many societies may initially fare better under liberal authoritarian regimes. First is the definition of liberal authoritarian. That he cites Pinochet's Chile as an example seriously undermines his assertion. Cote d'Ivoire under Félix Houphouët-Boigny or Tito's Yugoslavia might be better examples of what he intends; this is further bolstered by the state of those two countries a decade after Houphouët's and Tito's deathes respectively.

The other hole in the argument in the premise "many societies may initially fare better under liberal authoritarian regimes" is the word initially. This is based on the dubious presumption that the benevolent dictators will be wise enough (and modest enough) to transition to democracy when appropriate. It's a naively optimistic assumption at best; dangerous at worst, especially if policy will be based on this.


Two of the countries cited by Zakaria as models of liberal authoritarianism's success are Chile and South Korea. Yet the South Korean regime accepted democratic elections only AFTER massive protests made pressure on them unbearable. In 1988, Chile's Pinochet held a referendum on whether or not he should remain as head of state; a yes/no vote. He lost the referendum. But before he could declare the results of the poll meaningless, he was pre-empted by the head of the Chilean air force (I believe) who expressed his support for the transition. If not for this uncharacteristic break in military solidarity, Pinochet almost certainly would've ignored the plebiscite. This certainly does not auger well for Zakaria's assumption of liberal authoritarism being temporary and such benevolent dictators knowing when the country's "matured" enough for democracy.

He makes a compelling argument that illiberal democracy is not better than liberal authoritarism. Russia, Pakistan (under civilian rule) and other places certainly demonstrate that there's more to a democracy than just election day. What's less clear is whether Zakaria's liberal authoritarianism will ever have the limited shelf life he intends, without public pressure.

Nevertheless, the book looks worth a read if you have time. It many not be entirely on the mark but it seems to make many individual points worth considering. If you don't have time, the review nicely sums up his principle arguments.